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Bernard Suits on Capacities: Games, Perfectionism, and Utopia 
Christopher Yorke, The Open University 
 
Abstract 
An essential and yet often neglected motivation of Bernard Suits’ elevation of gameplay 
to the ideal of human existence is his account of capacities along perfectionist lines and the 
function of games in eliciting them. In his work Suits treats the expression of these capacities as 
implicitly good and the purest expression of the human telos. Although it is a possible 
interpretation to take Suits’ utopian vision to mean that gameplay in his future utopia must 
consist of the logically inevitable replaying of activities we conduct in the present for 
instrumental reasons (playing games-by-default), because gameplay for Suits is identical with 
the expression of sets of capacities specifically elicited by game rules, it is much more likely that 
he intends utopian gameplay to be an endless series of carefully crafted opportunities for the 
elicitation of special capacities (playing games-by-design), and thus embody his ideal of 
existence. This article therefore provides a new lens for understanding both Suits’ definitional 
work on gameplay, and its connection to his utopian vision in the last chapter of The 
Grasshopper: Games, Life, and Utopia.1 
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Suits and Hurka on Difficult Gameplay 
Bernard Suits is a central figure in the field of the philosophy of sports chiefly due to his 
oft-invoked definition of gameplay, which reads as follows: 
To play a game is to attempt to achieve a specific state of affairs [prelusory goal], using only means 
permitted by rules [lusory means], where the rules prohibit use of more efficient in favour of less efficient 
means [constitutive rules], and where the rules are accepted just because they make possible such 
activity [lusory attitude]. (Suits 2014, 43) 
 
He also gives a more succinct, ‘portable’ version of the definition: ‘playing a game is the 
voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles.’ (Suits 2014, 43) The ‘obstacle’ clause in 
the definition indicates that, for Suits, a player must encounter some minimal level of difficulty 
in playing for something to count as a game: consequently, overcoming this difficulty means 
passing the test posed by the game, by achieving its prelusory goal. What games test for are 
certain capacities—the skills necessary for intralusory (in-game) success. 
To find value in gameplay is to see value in the difficulty of overcoming unnecessary 
obstacles, as Thomas Hurka does, claiming that ‘difficult activities are as such good’ (Hurka 
2006, 221), in no small part because difficulty is a precondition for the further widely accepted 
good of achievement. On Hurka’s account, good (well-designed) games ‘cannot be so difficult 
that no one can succeed at them, but also cannot lack all challenge: they must strike a balance 
between too much and too little difficulty.’ (Hurka 2006, 221) Bad (poorly-designed) games, on 
the other hand, are bad because they can fail in two ways to test capacities: (1) ‘punishing’ 
games contain insurmountable obstacles in their design, and therefore give us difficulty without 
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achievement; and (2) ‘trivial’ games contain easily overcome obstacles in their design, and 
therefore give us (the appearance of) achievement without difficulty. Between these two 
extremes of punishing and trivial games, there is a Hurkean golden mean of good games, with 
an amount of difficulty suitable for the testing of human capacities, and thus producing 
achievement via gameplay. 
Hurka is solely concerned with only this set of good games ‘because they realize what 
seems like an internal goal of the design of games,’ (Hurka 2006, 221) which is to say, they 
provide opportunities for testing—and in the case of achievements, realizing—players’ 
capacities through appropriately difficult gameplay. For Suits, similarly, capacities play a 
motivational role: ‘People play games so that they can realize in themselves capacities not 
realizable (or not readily so) in the pursuit of their ordinary activities.’ (Suits 2007, 12) So good 
games test our capacities through the creation of unnecessary obstacles, and we seek out and 
play good games in order to have a venue for expressing and testing those capacities. 
Suits makes a further claim that ‘games generate new skills by erecting artificial 
constraints just so those constraints can be overcome.’ (Suits 1988, 4) What he presumably 
means here is that some capacities can only be realized and tested in games—because there is 
no natural circumstance which calls for their expression—such as the capacity which sources 
skill in achieving a checkmate in chess. These capacities are necessarily ones we cannot know 
we have in advance of playing a given game; but to say that that they are ‘generated’ by the 
game rather than ‘revealed’ through gameplay is slightly misleading. To understand why this is 
so, we must define what we mean by the term ‘capacity’. 
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Perfectionism and the Definition of ‘Capacity’ 
Both Suits and Hurka operate from a perfectionist moral framework, traceable back to 
the Aristotelian ideas of telos (human purpose) and eudaimonia (human flourishing). The 
concept of ‘capacity’ plays a central role in this schema, for it is by realizing our capacities that 
we bring our existences in line with our purpose as a species and arrive at a state of flourishing. 
As Gwen Bradford explains: ‘Knowledge, pleasure, achievement, loving relationships, and so on 
are valuable according to perfectionism because they are manifestations of special human 
features. Having these special features, and manifesting them, according to perfectionism, is 
having a good life. According to most perfectionist views, these features are certain capacities 
that are special to human beings. Developing these capacities to the most excellent degree 
possible is what perfectionism values.’ (Bradford 2015, 114-115) 
To simplify this picture, we might imagine that each capacity of a human being could be 
represented by a series of switches, each with a binary ‘on’ and ‘off’ position.2 Let us picture 
that all human capacities could be fully represented by one hundred such switches for each 
individual person. The more switches that were in the ‘on’ position for any given person, the 
more fully realized that person would be, and the closer to the ideal of the good life that person 
could come. In terms of actualization, we could say it would be better to be a thirty-switcher 
than a ten-switcher, and much better to be an eighty-switcher than either of those. Again, we 
must assume in this example that—for Suits, at least—some switches would always remain in 
the ‘off’ position unless certain games are played, for he claims that ‘if no one had ever used his 
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feet before the invention of foot racing, then foot racing would require the invention of 
running.’ (Suits 2014, 51) So gameplay for him either has the power to (a) create new human 
capacities as well as reveal pre-existing latent ones, or (b) only reveal latent capacities. Let us 
call (a) the strong reading, and (b) the weak reading of Suits on his relationship between 
capacities and gameplay. We will return to these divergent readings shortly after offering a 
definition of ‘capacity’. Suffice it to say for the moment that for Suits, the purpose of gameplay 
is to help us become more fully realized humans, by turning on certain types capacities that 
cannot be aroused in any other fashion. 
For the purposes of the argument at hand, I take capacities to be latent abilities to do, 
experience, or become something, which can be unlocked by fitting circumstances and thereby 
realized. More formally: an agent A has a capacity to X if and only if under condition set α, A 
can X. A realizes that capacity if A does X under α. The relation is one between an agent and an 
act, where that act issues from the agent after being evoked by a catalysing circumstance of a 
fitting kind. Without a triggering circumstance, therefore, a capacity will never find expression: 
for example, in a world without fungi there cannot be any mycologists, although being a 
mycologist is clearly within the potential capacities of a human being. However, whereas we 
can witness acts (the realizations of capacities), we cannot witness capacities themselves: we 
must instead intuit (or, more often, retrodict) capacities from acts. 
The preceding tentative account of capacities has been intentionally kept as 
metaphysically simple and transparent as possible, and it is my hope that this definition—
wanting though it may be in some regards—will suffice to demonstrate what Suits means when 
he uses the term. Given what has been said so far, we can make a few further remarks about 
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capacities. First, if we accept that the realization of capacities is an essential feature of the good 
life, it becomes inconsistent to hold that metaphysical entities such as evil, bad, or negative 
capacities exist. If such capacities were possible, we ought to condemn, rather than praise, their 
realization. This is not to say, of course, that skills sourced from capacities cannot be put to evil 
ends—for they very frequently are, in fact, as Bradford points out in her discussion of evil 
achievements. (Bradford 2015, 21-24) It is just that, along perfectionist lines, we would want to 
assert that capacities (in their unrealized form) are a priori good. 
Secondly, because the realization of human capacities is the telos of our species, we can 
reasonably expect that the experience of doing so would be enjoyable, meaningful, and good in 
itself for individual members of our species. The most robust range of our possible capacities is 
given (and limited) by our species, though it is presumably reduced in scope by the influences 
of culture, social strata, and peer group, as well as our individual limitations. However, just as 
we were able to previously compare hypothetical individuals in terms of degrees of capacity-
realization, we could conceivably attempt a similar comparison between hypothetical cultures 
(or smaller groups). For instance, if the individuals that make up the population of culture C 
have 30% of their capacities realized on average at any given time, and the individuals that 
make up the population of culture D have only 10% of their capacities realized on average at 
any given time, then ceteris paribus we can non-controversially claim that culture C is better off 
than culture D in terms of its average rate of capacity realization across individuals. 
Thirdly, by extension we can posit an ideal of a fully realized human as someone who is 
actively expressing all of their potential capacities. Without committing to a fixed number, we 
can say that the number of contingently realizable capacities will differ between individual 
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members of the same species, and that the more capacities that are being expressed on a 
regular basis, the more fully realized an individual would be. We can state these general 
maxims without definitively judging whether total (100%) capacity actualization in an 
individual—a full realization of all capacities at all times—is either a contingently unrealizable or 
conceptually impossible ideal, or whether such a state would be generally desirable (or even 
intelligible) from a non-ideal standpoint.3 Remaining agnostic on the extreme ideal case costs us 
nothing here. 
Fourthly, we must acknowledge some epistemic issues in discussing capacities, for 
although we may attempt to enumerate the full range of possible human capacities, we cannot 
be confident that we have been utterly exhaustive. Nor, even in the case of capacities that are 
familiar to us and are generally acknowledged, can we glean precise percentiles of their 
realization in any given individual: the exact numbers, if such exist, are hidden from us. Thus, 
since the proportion of our individual capacities that are realized is an epistemically inaccessible 
percentile, we could not and would not know if and when we were to become fully realized 
agents. 
 Finally, we must make a distinction between at least two types of capacities: innate and 
learned. Regarding innate capacities, it seems that at least some very basic capacities are 
present from birth, such as the capacity to breathe. But can we fairly call a skill or ability that is 
always ‘on’ the expression of a capacity? For capacities must prima facie be at least potentially 
latent. Something that is always ‘on’—like the ability to breathe oxygen—looks like it must 
count as something else; though perhaps if we are transported into an oxygen-free atmosphere 
(like deep space) without a breathing apparatus, it might make more intuitive sense to say in 
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that case that we do indeed have a capacity to breathe oxygen-rich gases, but circumstances do 
not allow for the realization of that capacity. Thus it appears that we can conclude that all living 
humans must have at least one or two of their metaphorical switches (representing innate 
capacities) in the ‘on’ position at any given time. Further: an entity which is not actively 
expressing any capacity at all would not appear to be a human being on this account. 
Regarding learned capacities, we might wonder: is learning itself a capacity—perhaps 
even a capacity by way of which we can acquire other capacities? This recalls our previous 
question: can a capacity be created, or are they always present and merely revealed? The quick 
and dirty answer would be to say that a human being can only do what human beings already 
have the capacities to do (just as a tree cannot grow from an egg, nor a chicken from a nut). If 
new capacities could be created (as in the strong reading of Suits given above), this would 
require changing the ‘hardware’ of the human body and brain. This view of capacities might 
make sense from an intergenerational or transhumanist standpoint, with some finessing, as we 
will discuss below. However, standard accounts of perfectionism only advocate developing 
human capacities, not superhuman or posthuman ones. But if learning is simply a matter of 
revealing pre-existing capacities (as in the weak reading of Suits given above), then doing so 
requires nothing more extreme than changing the ‘software’ of our individual thoughts and 
habits, or perhaps our cultural outlook, which is well within the remit of perfectionist ideology. 
 
Suits on Utopian Capacities and Utopian Gameplay 
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Recently, Suits’ ‘utopian vision’ in The Grasshopper: Games, Life, and Utopia, his work 
on the form and nature of utopian existence, has also risen to relative prominence and critical 
analysis (McLaughlin 2008, Vossen 2016, Yorke 2017) despite the enduring central focus on his 
definition of games. However, his concept of ‘capacities’ in relation to the utopian thesis has to 
date received insufficient attention. In this section I will endeavor to draw these threads 
together. 
In Suits’ utopian thought experiment all human needs and wants are immediately met 
by telepathically-controlled supercomputers. Humanity has access to the logical equivalent of 
an infinite number of wish-granting magical lamps, each capable of granting infinite wishes. 
(Suits 2014, 182-183) So we must assume that if Suits’ utopians want to modify their bodies, or 
even transfer their consciousnesses to other bodies, this is within the realm of possibility for 
them—physics goes on holiday. Thus radical changes to the human body itself may allow for 
the creation of new human capacities in utopia, in addition to those which could be facilitated 
by the introduction of novel sports equipment, which creates a hypothetical set of ‘utopian 
sports’ which would vary considerably from our contemporary sports: these are, arguably, 
Suits’ famous ‘sports and games unthought of today.’ (Suits 2014, 194) This line of 
interpretation clearly favors the strong reading of Suits on capacities. 
There is an aspirational dimension to our choice of games for Suits, for ‘with the 
invention of games far removed from the pursuits of ordinary life, quite new capacities emerge, 
and hitherto unknown skills are developed.’ (Suits 2007, 12) Pedalling, in other words, can be 
thought of as a capacity that had little opportunity for meaningful expression prior to the 
invention of the pedal; and we can imagine, by extension, that with the invention of new pieces 
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of sporting equipment, new parts of the body might become central to gameplay. Imagine, for 
instance, a new sport wherein a player’s moves were controlled solely through the fine-tuned 
flexing of their back muscles via an electronic interface: this would valorize a human capacity 
that has had few other relevant arenas of expression up to this point. 
Thus, when Suits writes of ‘sports and games that will require for their exploitation—
that is, for their mastery and enjoyment—as much energy as is expended today in serving the 
institutions of scarcity’ (Suits 2014, 194) with regard to utopian games, what he is seemingly 
referring to is creating as-yet-undiscovered new capacities expressed in new forms of 
gameplay, and thus a more fully realized kind of human being that would be playing them: a 
utopian. I have suggested elsewhere that such utopians on a strong reading are unrelatable 
entities; they are, at best, a successor species, a placeholder for the beings who will play games 
in Suits’ utopia, and that their values and mode of existence are necessarily obscured from our 
understanding, hidden behind an unbridgeable cultural gap between us and them. (Yorke 2017) 
 I also acknowledged that this strong interpretation, while defensible in light of Suits’ 
more hyperbolic statements, is perhaps not the most charitable or productive way to 
understand his utopian vision. The weak reading of capacities for Suits must be closer to what 
he intended. Schematically, Suits can be read as implying that games, as voluntary efforts to 
overcome unnecessary obstacles, provide the required circumstances for the expression of pre-
existing latent capacities. Conceptually distinct games typically elicit different capacities by 
design, and a utopia of gameplay would need to be replete with games specially designed to 
promote human flourishing through the expression of as many of these capacities as possible 
(especially due to the fact that the instrumental pressures and demands which previously 
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provided the circumstances for their expression would be extinguished, via the advent of 
utopian material superabundance). 
The ‘duty to design’ utopian games which Suits states we have (Suits 2014, 194) is a task 
to be completed in the present, to begin the work of establishing a utopian culture, and can be 
parsed in such a way as to fit with the weak reading on capacities. Let us call his argument for 
this duty the utopian game design thesis, which can be briefly summarized as follows: (1) 
Certain capacities can only be expressed via gameplay; (2) the expression of those game-
exclusive capacities is essential to the project of realizing our best selves; (3) these capacities 
aren’t generally routinely being expressed in present gameplay (which may in part explain why 
many contemporary games have the low reputations they currently suffer from); but (4) these 
capacities should be being expressed via gameplay, because (5) we ought to try to become our 
best selves if such is possible; thus (6) we need to design a set of utopian games which correctly 
identify and elicit the expression of these crucial game-exclusive capacities. This aspirational 
model of game design fully employs the cultural technology of games and gameplay in a new 
way—not as a pastime, but as a means for individual (and ultimately cultural) transformation—
the Suitsian formulation of ludic alchemy. The right kind of gameplay, for Suits, terraforms 
Earth into Utopia. 
 
Objections to the Utopian Game Design Thesis 
Against the weak reading of Suits on capacities and its relation to utopian gameplay, and 
specifically against the utopian game design thesis as laid out above, several axes of criticism 
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can be levied. It could be claimed that we simply don’t know enough about the scope and 
nature of human capacities to be able design games adequate to the task of consistently 
uncovering or eliciting them. Alternately, it could be claimed that we don’t know enough about 
the science or art of game design to be able to design games which are sufficiently compelling 
to realize the latent capacities that we do understand and non-controversially acknowledge we 
have. Perhaps most troublingly, there is an additional theoretical worry that if there is no 
essentially stable utopian body, then there can be no such thing as a utopian sport to be 
designed. 
Counter to the first objection that we are insufficiently acquainted with human 
capacities to design games to elicit them, Suits argues that: ‘Rules are the crux of games 
because it is the rules of any particular game that generate the skills appropriate to that game.’ 
(Suits 1988, 5) In other words, for Suits we needn’t worry about having an insufficient grasp of 
human capacities, because game designers can more or less retrodict these through good game 
design: if we can identify a skill, we can intuit a capacity it is sourced from. Jon Pike has recently 
written a nice reductio ad absurdum of this position, stating ‘it is the skills that generate the 
rules, not the other way around. We have no rules to cover contests of unaided flying, and 
constructing some rules to cover such putative sports would not allow us to develop the skills 
to enact them. For unaided flying to be a sport, we do not need rules; we need wings.’ (Pike 
2018, 328) While this criticism does apply to the sloppy wording of Suits’ formulation quoted 
above, I believe that the intention behind the text can still be rescued. For Suits obviously did 
not believe that a game rulebook would produce the miracle of unaided flight in human 
beings—but he did believe that what human capacities do exist would be developed, when and 
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where they were properly elicited, under the circumstances of gameplay. This seems to 
generally be the case in practice, at least where the game is good (well designed) in Hurka’s 
sense. Pike’s game, by comparison, is just bad, but not in the sense that it is punishing (too 
difficult) or trivial (too easy), but in the sense that it is contingently impossible and as such 
cannot even be attempted.4 
Yet, even if contingently impossible games like Pike’s sport of unaided flight might never 
get played, its ruleset might yet display the virtues of consistency and clarity, and sit on a shelf 
ready for use in the highly unlikely circumstance of a viable bird-human genetic hybrid being 
produced—and, in that odd hypothetical case, rules-appropriate skills would still have to be 
learned and developed by the game’s participants. Indeed, the only class of games for which 
skills could never under any circumstances be developed in line with its ruleset would be 
conceptually impossible games—for instance, those that require their players to draw squared 
circles. In any other case, it seems like game designers could potentially work something out 
with regards to fitting their rulesets to those capacities which they have some reason to think 
exist (or at least could exist in a nearby possible world). 
Game design is nevertheless somewhat philosophically undertheorized, which could 
leave Suits open to the second objection: that we do not understand the principles of game 
design well enough to reliably elicit human capacities with it. While it is true that philosophers 
have not yet produced a definitive and satisfactory answer to the question of exactly what role 
game design should have in producing human wellbeing, it will be evident from our preceding 
discussion that at least Suits and Hurka, among others, coordinate on the position that it does 
have a role to play.5 But even if they are correct, the question remains as to whether we ought 
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to regard game design as a hard science that we could hypothetically completely understand 
and eventually master, or as a soft art, whose forms and norms shift according to time, place, 
and custom. 
From a Suitsian perspective, it seems we must treat game design like a science, for its 
task in his schema is to provide a universal source of entertainment for all utopians, protecting 
them from boredom-induced madness and thus vouchsafing the socio-political stability of his 
utopia. If anything, game design in this context looks like a modest expression of situationism, 
the psychological theory that certain environmental features can have an overriding influence 
on the moral actions of the agents inhabiting them. In line with Suits’ utopian game design 
thesis, it appears that playing good games could conceivably condition us to be good people. 
Thus on Suits’ capacity model of gameplay, a science of game design could help 
utopians (and, arguably, pre-utopians like ourselves) become better people by providing 
greater and greater obstacles for them to overcome and thus unlocking greater and greater 
capacities. For if the definition of gameplay is identical with the expression of human capacities, 
then what is Suits’ utopia of continuous, endless gameplay except an unending expression of 
the range of all latent human capacities? The utopian game design thesis thus stated fits with 
Suits’ overall schema, but yields the odd result that designers of well-designed games are 
already de facto involved in a project of moral perfectionism, whether or not they are aware of 
it (and most, presumably, are not). 
Arguably, the principles of game design are sufficiently developed to tell us roughly 
which kinds of games are adequate for testing human capacities and which are not, and to 
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what extent. Tic-tac-toe, for instance, only requires the understanding of one simple strategy in 
order to fully master it, so we can safely conclude that few or no important human capabilities 
are tested or unlocked in playing it. Slot machines are much worse, in that even less cognition 
and dexterity are required in their operation, and there is even less room for the exercise of 
player agency. But more complex games, which produce more intense and difficult challenges 
for their players, will correspondingly produce higher-value achievements via their gameplay—
and thus better enable the realization of their players’ capacities. The more we develop our 
account of the theory and practice of how game design identifies, isolates, and elicits various 
capacities, the safer Suits looks to be from the criticism that our understanding of games is too 
primitive to reliably elicit capacities through erecting obstacles of properly-calibrated difficulty. 
Difficulty is, however, agent-relative: what is hard (or even impossible) for me to 
achieve might be easy for you to achieve, and vice versa; so the game that you find trivial I may 
find to be punishing. In this way, intralusory achievements must be understood as subjective. 
This is why there must be a plurality of games in Suits’ utopia: there can be no ‘one game to 
amuse them all’. His utopians would seek the kind of games which would provide the best fit in 
terms of challenge (maxing out their capacities), based on age, ability, and bodily build 
(assuming, for the moment, that these parameters are fixed for the purpose of playing utopian 
games). 
However, following the lines of Suits’ utopian thought experiment we can plainly see 
that having omniscient, omnipotent players would eliminate all potential sources of difficulty. 
For if utopian players of any sport wished themselves into wildly different bodily configurations 
from each other prior to a match (via their wish-granting supercomputers), then nothing could 
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stop them. From this fact we could infer that there is no essential utopian body, and thus there 
can be no utopian sports.6 This is because the capacity to throw a three-pointer in a game of 
basketball relies on having human arms within a certain range of lengths, the court being 
constituted of certain measurements based on the average rate of locomotion for a human, 
and the net being set far enough off the ground that making the shot is not trivial (say, not 
lower than the average human’s height), but not so far off the ground as to make it punishing 
for the majority of human beings (say, not higher than a two-story building). In other words, the 
goodness of basketball’s game design directly relies on the relative genotypical and 
phenotypical stability, and thus the predictable capacities, of our species. In order to protect 
the logical possibility of good utopian sports existing, Suits would either be forced to add the 
caveat that the telepathically-controlled supercomputers of his techno-Cockaygne could not be 
used to transmogrify the human subject, or—more plausibly—require that utopian players 
coordinate on game rules forbidding or circumscribing their unrestricted intralusory use. 
 
Conclusion 
Suits’ utopia is attained under conditions wherein instrumental activity is made 
redundant by technological advances, and everything which can be known in theory is in fact 
known in practice. Humans would then be free to pursue an unfettered life of intrinsically 
valuable game-playing, which in Suits’ view best fits the human telos, and thus opens up the 
most promising available avenue to his version of eudaimonia. However, in order to sustain 
meaningful activity under such conditions, Suits must subscribe to something like the utopian 
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game design thesis, which is the logical extension of his capacity model of games—by designing 
better games, which allow for the expression of the greatest range of human capacities and the 
widest range of human experience, we allow for the possibility of making better people through 
gameplay. The best games are utopian games, and playing these utopian games shapes the best 
people, who are—or become—utopians. This is a reasonable projection of what Suits called the 
‘ideal of existence’ (Suits 2014, 182) when his capacity model is taken into account; and this 
perfectionist backdrop helps make better sense of his urging contemporary game designers ‘to 
begin the immense work of devising these wonderful [utopian] games now,’ (Suits 2014, 194) 
for the realization of our human capacities is a moral imperative in the present even more so 
than in any utopian projection. 
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1 Jon Pike, Alex Barber, Thi Nguyen, Paul Gaffney, and several anonymous reviewers have given helpful feedback 
on earlier drafts of this paper, for which I am extremely grateful. 
2 I am using a ‘switch’ metaphor to represent capacities here as a prose-friendly expedient, but in actuality 
capacities are more akin to dials on my account. Dials can be completely turned off (0%), completely turned on 
(100%), or stand at some percentile of ‘on-ness’ in between these two extremes. A ‘dial’ metaphor helps us explain 
why it makes more sense to say that there is one general capacity for all language use, instead of claiming that 
proficiency in each language should count as distinct expressions of separate capacities. Saying that a person who 
is fluent in both English and French is operating at 46% on the dial of their potential linguistic capacity would seem 
to make more sense than to say that they have both their ‘English language capacity’ and ‘French language 
capacity’ switches on. Being bilingual counts as two specific instantiations of the more general linguistic capacity, 
each of which nudge the ‘dial’ of realization of that capacity upwards. Thanks to Paul Gaffney for raising the point 
regarding language in this context. 
3 There may indeed be an incommensurability of certain capacities—speed and strength for instance, or power and 
cunning—which make the fully realized individual an incoherent ideal, mirroring Isaiah Berlin’s argument regarding 
the incompatibility of certain goods in “The Pursuit of the Ideal”. 
4 Ignoring, for the moment, the speculative evolutionary perspective from which we might argue that ‘arms are 
latent wings’. 
5 Thi Nguyen believes that games have a morally transformative function in turning competitive urges into 
competitive behavior, and that good game design plays a central role in enabling this transformation. (Nguyen 
2017) 
6 This line of argument evolved from a long-running discussion with Jon Pike. 
                                                          
